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NOTE

RESTORING THE WATER QUALITY OF THE GREAT LAKES: THE
JOINT COMMITMENT OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

by Carl A. Esterhay*
I.

INTRODUCTION

INOTTAWA, ON November 22, 1978, Canada and the.United States
manifested their commitment to the water quality of the Great Lakes
system1 when they signed the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of
1978.2 This bilateral agreement represents the latest link between Canada
and the United States in a chain of events directed toward the improve3
ment of the Great Lakes.
This note will contemplate the international and legal ramifications
of the plan of action undertak6n by Canada and the United States in
response to the severe problem of water pollution in the Great Lakes system. Following a brief synopsis of the geographical and demographical
characteristics of the Great Lakes region, the note will examine previous
agreements between the United States and Canada. Special emphasis will
be placed on the development of the International Joint Commission
(IJC) as the body responsible for providig the framework in which the
two countries address specific issues arising between them, especially
those issues concerning the Great Lakes. Finally, a close scrutinization of
the 1972 and 1978 Water Quality- Agreements will highlight their
strengths and weaknesses in attempting to restore the beauty and water
quality of the Great Lakes.
J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 1981.
This system is defined by the 1978 Water Quality Agreement as including all streams,
rivers, and lakes "that are within the drainage basin of the St. Lawrence River at or upstream from the point at which this river becomes the international boundary between Canada and the United States." Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality, November 22,
1978, United States-Canada art. I, § h, 31 U.S.T. 33, T.I.A.S. No. 9257 [hereinafter cited as
1978 Water Quality Agreement].
*
1

"

Id.

" The 1978 Water Quality Agreement is actually a more comprehensive and stringent
reaffirmation of the Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality, April 15, 1972, United
States-Canada, 23 U.S.T. 301, T.I.A.S. 7312 [hereinafter cited as 1972 Water Quality Agreement]. The evolution of this effort by the two countries to bind themselves to bilateral
pollution control also developed from previous relations between Canada and the United
States.
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II.

THE GREAT LAKES BASIN REGION

4

The Great Lakes system, containing 20 percent of the world's total
fresh water, represents the largest body of fresh water in the world. 5 The
system covers an area of 84,000 square miles (216,300 square kilometers)
and drains an additional land area of 208,000 square miles (538,900
square kilometers).6 The Basin Region spans 690 miles from north to
south and 860 miles from east to west.7 Undoubtedly, the Region is larger
than most assume and the grave impact of pollution probably goes largely
unrecognized.
The Great Lakes form an integral waterway system for the North
American continent and serve as a large part of the boundary between
two friendly nations,8 touching on eight states and one province. In addition to the pure physical vastness of the basin region, the population affected by the Great Lakes system is staggering. The basin presently contains a population of 38 million Americans and Canadians, and, is
expected to grow to 60 million within the next 20 years.10
Aside from the burgeoning population, this region also serves as the
center of much, if not most, of the industrialized and urbanized centers of
Canada and United States. The fresh water is used for everything from
diluting municipal wastes and cooling nuclear reactors to shipping, recreation, fishing and drinking."' Thus, the pressure put on this supply is tremendous and, quite predictably, this demand has taken its toll. The
stress resulted in a severe deterioration in the water quality of the Great
Lakes. This deterioration and pollution was not merely a product of modern technology, but also the result of historical and constant abuse of the
Great Lakes without proper, concerted management. Admittedly, "it is
unrealistic to believe that pollution that has been going on for some 200
years can be remedied in terms of several years." 12 Nevertheless, the
spirit of cooperation between Canada and the United States in developing
4 The term "basin" includes the drainage area as well as the Great Lakes system. 1978
Water Quality Agreement, supra'note 1, art. I.
5 D. PIPER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE GREAT LAKES 5 (1976).
6 International Reference Group on Great Lakes Pollution from Land Use Activities,
Environmental Management Strategy for the Great Lakes System 1 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as PLUARG].
7 Swezey, Management of the InternationalGreat Lakes, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 103,
104 (1974).
I Of the total 5,525 miles of boundary between Canada and the United States, almost
half pass through rivers and lakes which are known as "boundary waters." See Bourne,
Canada and the Law of InternationalDrainageBasins, in CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 468 (Macdonald, Morris & Johnston eds. 1973).
9 TIME, Dec. 3, 1979, at 107.
10 See, e.g., J. PICKARD, METROPOLITANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1959).
11 The Great Lakes serve as the drinking supply for 23.5 million people in the United
States. See TIME, supra note 8, at 107.
'2 United States/Canada International Joint Commission, Sixth Annual Report on
Water Quality 4 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Report].
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a tradition of bilateral coordination in international legal matters has
produced optimistic results. This optimism was originally grounded in

previous international agreements which provided the framework for the
197213 and 1978 Water Quality Agreements.14
III.

PRECONTEMPORARY AGREEMENTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT
COMMISSION

A.

Canadian-U.S.Agreements

Canada and the United States demonstrated their willingness to
compromise on legal issues concerning the Great Lakes when they signed
the Definitive Treaty of Peace in 1783.15 The Treaty fixed the northern
boundary of the United States in the middle of the Great Lakes." This
sensible and simple demarcation reflected the ability of the two nations
to reach practical solutions to problems confronting the Great Lakes.
In contrast to the contemporary problems of pollution, most early
disputes involving the Great Lakes centered on navigation 17 and water
utilization. Late nineteenth century industrial and population growths
produced conflicts concerning the diversions and use of the waters for
irrigation, recreation, power generation, and sanitation. Thus unilateral
decisions by a state, nation, or province to divert the waters in its territory in any manner it pleased greatly added to the non-navigable uses of
the water.' 8
Canada and the United States became increasingly upset about these
issues but there was no mechanism for resolving disputes over water utilization. In 1902, the U.S. Congress authorized the President to invite the
British Government to aid in the establishment of an international waterways commission to investigate and report on the use of Canadian-U.S.
boundary waters. The International Waterways Commission, established
in 1905,19 enthusiastically approached its duties but was hampered by the
lack of principles relating to the non-navigable uses of the waters.' 0 The
Commissioners, three each from the United States and Canada, recom1972 Water Quality Agreement, supra note 3.
1978 Water Quality Agreement, supra note 1.
15 Definitive Treaty of Peace, Sept. 3, 1783, United States-Great Britain, 8 Stat. 80.
15
14

16

Id. art. II.

See Treaty of Washington, May 8, 1783, United States-Great Britain, art. XXVI, 18
Stat. 335, by which the United States was granted free navigation of the St. Lawrence River
in Canada by the British Government.
" Chicago implemented a plan at the turn of the century to divert water from Lake
Michigan in order to move the city's sewage. Great Lakes water was also being diverted in
the effort to generate hydroelectric power at Niagara Falls. See Bourne, supra note 8, at
469.
"' See C. J. CHACKO, THE INTERNATIONAL JoINr COMMISSION BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA AND THE DOMINION OF CANADA 74-75 (1932).
17

20 1 DocUMENTS ON CANADIAN EXTERNAL RELATIONS 361n.1 (Canadian Dep't External

Aft. 1967).
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mended that the United States and Great Britain enter into a treaty setting forth rules and principles to resolve
problems of water utilization
21
between Canada and the United States.

In 1909, the United States and Great Britain heeded these recom-,
mendations and signed the Boundary Waters Treaty.22 This treaty was
the most important instrument ever concluded between the United States
and Canada in terms of the Great Lakes system. The bilateral commission it created eventually produced the 1972 and 1978 Water Quality
Agreements and prescribed international rules and principles necessary to
"restore and enhance water quality in the Great Lakes System. '23
The treaty defined the water boundary between the United States
and Canada:
For the purposes of this-treaty boundary waters are defined as the waters
from main shore to main shore of the lakes and rivers and connecting
waterways, or the portions thereof, along which the international boundary between the United States and the Dominion of Canada passes, including all bays, arms, and inlets thereof....24

Obviously, the Great Lakes system fits within this definition of boundary
waters but there is more to this simple delineation. Ironically, the term
boundary waters and the above definition do not suggest a condition of
separate, sovereign interests. Rather, the nature of the flowing subject
matter and the definition connote a joint interest that transcends international law. Under traditional precepts of international law, a state enjoyed complete discretion over the use of its territorial water.2 5 This unilateral attitude, however, evolved into a sense of joint responsibility for
the boundary waters that later manifested itself in the 1972 and 1978
agreements. It is a credit to Canada and the United States that such a
clear enunciation of sovereign interests under international law set the
stage for transnational cooperation.
This dichotomy of unilateral control and joint responsibility and its
beneficial ramifications were evident throughout the text of the Boundary
Waters Treaty. Each country maintained exclusive jurisdiction and control over the diversion of waters within its territory, but neither Canada
nor the United States surrendered its right to object to any diversion of
waters that could produce "material injury to the navigation on its inter21. Id.
" Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters Between the United States and Canada, Jan.
11, 1909, United States-Great Britain, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548 [hereinafter cited as
Boundary Waters Treaty]. For a description of the negotiations that gave rise to this accord,
see BLOOMFIELD & FITZGERALD, BouNDARY WATERS PROBLEMS OF CANADA AND THE UNITED
STATES 11-13 (1958).
22 1972 Water Quality
24

Agreement, supra note 3, Preamble.
Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 22, Preliminary Article.

2' See D. PnpzR, supra note 5, at 75.
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ests side of the boundary" '
Article II of the Treaty, which implied complete jurisdiction over territorial waters, represented the infant state of the international law of
boundary waters in 1909. As one author suggests, however, a different international doctrine has evolved since that time. This modern doctrine of
international law is that of "equitable utilization," and it is premised on
the notion of limited territorial sovereignty.17 Equal utilization dictates
that each state within an international drainage basin is entitled to share
in the beneficial uses of the waters.2 8 This firmly entrenched principle of
international law has important consequences for the status of pollution
in the Great Lakes system. Therefore, in a backhanded manner, the tradition of complete dominion espoused in the Boundary Waters Treaty
has developed into the international legal principle that nations in a basin system are obligated to one another. Fortunately for the Great Lakes,
Canada and the United States have begun to cooperate in fulfilling their
obligations.
The doctrine of equitable utilization of the Great Lakes squares with
the physical nature of the problem of water pollution. Water contamination normally arises from both shores of the boundary waters, especially
when the drainage area is as industrialized and urbanized as those areas
surrounding the Lakes in Canada and the United States. The contamination transcends territorial interests and affects the boundary waters of
both countries. Thus, the nature of the problem also dictates joint action
and not exclusive responsibility, or response.
The Boundary Waters Treaty laid.an important legal obligation upon
Canada and the United States to eventually control water 'pollution.
Though pollution was not, a major concern in 1909, Article IV of the
Treaty prohibited water contamination. Thus, "it is further agreed that
the waters herein defined as boundary wateis and water flowing across
the boundary shall not be
polluted on either side to the injury of health
or-property on the other. ' 29 Yet, this provision estblished neither a bilateral mechanism for controlling pollution nor a penalty for a state that
failed to fulfill its obligation. But the existence of this unenforceable obligation established a legal principle to which Canada and the United
States would eventually pay homage. This simple prohibition would become the guiding light for more complex arrangements between the
United States and Canada as the Great Lakes water pollution required
their increased attention.
2

Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 22, art. II.
Bourne, supra note 8, at 475.

27 See

28 For a more complete discussion of the development of the doctrine of equitable utilization, see Bourne, supra note 8, at 475-76, in which he cites to the Report of the FiftySecond Conference of the International Law Association held at Helhinki, Aug. 14-20, 1967.

Id. at 496n.54.
29

Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 22, art. IV.
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The InternationalJoint Commission

The Boundary Waters Treaty also created the International Joint
Commission3O (IJC), a six-person binational commission, consisting of
three Presidentially-appointed members from the United States and
three members from Canada appointed by the Governor General in
Council. 3' The IJC has emerged as the water pollution watchdog for the
United States and Canada. Thus, although the Treaty's water pollution
prohibition failed to provide any enforcement mechanisms, it did provide
a rational framework for future cooperation.
The Treaty conferred jurisdiction upon the IJC in two areas. First,
the Commission was granted absolute jurisdiction over uses, obstructions
or diversions of boundary waters affecting the natural level or water flow
of the nonresponsible country.32 If a project affects either the level or
flow, the party responsible for the project, whether a public or private
entity, or an individual, must apply to the IJC for approval.3 3 The Commission's decisions are binding upon the parties.".
Absolute jurisdiction, over prospective uses is not crucial to an analysis o'f the Commission's relatibnship to the problems of Great Lakes water
pollution. Some mention of its quasi-adjudicatory role. is important, however, for it demonstrates the broad responsibilities vested in the IJC in
specific areas, as well as the complete trust that Canada and th&United
States have placed in this transnational organization concerning international legal matters. It is very unusual for national governments to delegate decision-making authority-which might have a profound impact-on
water uses within its territory to such an international body. Although
this compulsory jurisdiction is limited to prospective uses, it signifiesthe
high esteem in which both countries hold the:IJC, and it symbohfzes the
close cooperation between Canada and th United States.
A further examination of the absolute qpplication process serves as
an introduction to the other type of jurisdiction conferred upon the IJC.
30 Id. art. VII.
31Id. Even with this representative appearance the IJC has developed a tradition of
independence and impartiality. Between 1912, and 1973, the IJC divided along national

lines only three times. See Swezey, supra note 7, at 1M7-18.
3' Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 22, art. VII.
33 Id. arts. III & IV. Private applicants must first apply to the government of the territory within which the desired use is to occur. Id. See also I.J.C. Rules of Procedure and
Text of Treaty, Rule 12(2) (1964)[hereinafter cited as Rules of Procedure]. Thus, the IJC
adheres to the procedural rule of international law which holds that "private interests do
not pjoy direct access to international tribunals." See D. PPER, supra note 5, at 81.
PjArticle VIII of the Boundary Waters Treaty enumerates boundary water uses in the
following order of precedence: (1) for domestic and sanitary purposes; (2) for navigation,
including the service of canals for the purposes of navigation; (3)for power and irrigation
purposes. All prospective uses are subordinate to those listed above and the IJC does not
permit those which materially interfere with them. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 22,

art. VIII.

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:208

The finality of the IJC's decisions on applications and the willingness of
Canada and the United States to defer in such matters contrasts sharply
with their hesitancy to expand compulsive jurisdiction in other areas such
as water pollution. Despite Article IV's prohibition on pollution, the
Commission has not assumed responsibility for assessing and enforcing
liabilities against offenders of the pollution prohibition. Under the
Treaty, the IJC may have had the last word on uses of boundary waters,
but the United States and Canada were reluctant to listen to what the
Commission had to say about the abuses of the Great Lakes system.
Article IX of the Boundary Waters Treaty vests general jurisdiction
in the IJC over specific problems referred to it by Canada, the United
States, or both nations."" The countries agreed that a reference to the IJC
would be appreciated for "(Q)uestions or matters of difference arising between them involving the rights, obligations, or interests of either in relation to the other or to the inhabitants of the other, along the common
frontier between the United States and the Dominion of Canada... .,,"6 If
the Commission receives such a reference, it is then authorized to investigate the facts and circumstances of the referred subject matter. In cases
a rewhere all or a majority of the Commissioners agree, the IJC makes
3 7
port to both governments upon completion of its investigation.
When the Commission receives a reference, it hppoints one or more
joint Technical or Advisory Boards which are composed of an equal number of members from each country.38 Completed Board studies are published and released to the public. " ' At that point, the IJC holds public
hearings in which interested parties and governments may participate.'0
The IJC assembles all the data, evidence, and opinions and submits its
report of conclusions and recommendations to the two national governments which either adopt or reject the Commission's position.
This reference procedure has received more emphasis than the application process in the past 30 years. Of the first 50 cases brought before
the IJC, 39 were applications for prospective uses." During this period
the Canadian and the U.S. governments served primarily as messengers
, Id. art. IX.
Id.
3
Id. If there is an equal division of opinion, the Commissioners, under Article IX, file
separate reports on each side with their respective governments.
" Rules of Procedure, supra note 33, Rule 28(1).
3' Id. Rule 28(3).
' Id. Rule 29(5).

,1I.J.C. Docket Nos. 1-50, in International Joint Commission, The Annual Report,
1976, App. 2, at 32-34 (1977). Most of the prospective use cases involve the use of boundary
waters for hydroelectric power. The most famous case was that concerning the St. Lawrence
power development. In 1952, Canada and the United States agreed to file joint applications
with the IJC seeking its approval for construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway hydroelectric
facilities. The IJC approved the applications, but only after setting down strict requirements as to liability, indemnity, and supervision. I.J.C. Docket No. 68, id. at 35. See BLOOMFIELD & FITZGERALD, supra note 22, at 199-202.
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funnelling potential projects to the Commission for final approval. Application cases are less complex than references and do not require any
broad policy decisions. The proposed use is approved if it does not conflict with or subordinate other uses. Lately, however, Canada and the
United States have increasingly invoked the reference procedure, and
have allowed the IJC to become more active in policy matters. Of the 32
cases before the IJC in the period between 1955 and 1976, 19 made their
way to the Commission via the reference route.42
Thus, the reference procedure under Article IX of the Boundary Waters Treaty has evolved into the major mechanism of regulating the
boundary waters and the entire Great Lakes system. This increased use
of the IJC by Canada and the United States reflects the growing trust
that the two countries have placed in the Commission to determine such
matters as the cause, effects, and cures of water pollution. The 1972 and
1978 Water Quality Agreements represent the strides that the IJC has
made in becoming an instrumental and dominant weapon in the war
against Great Lakes water pollution. It is now necessary and useful, however, to trace the steps the Commission has made since its inception to
reach its current level of influence.
It must be stressed again, however, that under the reference procedure, Canada and the United States are still free to ignore the Commission's recommendations. The IJC's lack of enforcement powers serves as a
crucial backdrop to any discussion of its role in the problem of Great
Lakes deterioration. Any increase in influence achieved by the IJC is severely curtailed by the lack of a non-political adjudication of environmental matters. Water pollution of an international system such as the Great
Lakes raises a peculiar blend of national and international politics and
legal principles. Thus, the international legal principle of equitable utilization " may conflict with national priorities. Or, if either Canada or the
United States can demonstrate a specific injury within its waters, it would
be practically impossible to prove the causal connection between the injury and a particular source, especially when both sides are probably responsible to some degree." Certainly neither country would be willing to
defer to a transnational organization such as the IJC under those circumstances. Yet, even with all its limitations, the Commission has still played
a vital role throughout its 58-year history of the area of pollution of the
boundary waters. The drafters of the Boundary Waters Treaty can, therefore, take credit for this accomplishment.
41

I.J.C. Docket Nos. 71-102, supra note 41, at 35-36.

i See text, supra note 25-31.
" See Dickstein, International Lake and River Pollution Control: Questions
of
Method, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 487, 517 (1973).
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C. The International Joint Commission and Boundary Waters
Pollution
One of the first items of business conducted by the IJC in 1912 was a
request to investigate the condition of the Great Lakes system and other
boundary waters. 45 This was a very interesting request for two reasons.
First, the issue of water pollution was not given much play in the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 except for the brief and absolute prohibition of
Article IV.4 6 Yet, the quickness with which this provision was utilized reflects the historical concern of the two countries with the condition of the
boundary waters. Second, the request was made under the previously discussed Article IX reference procedure. The countries had not hesitated to
utilize the mechanism with which a great deal of the work concerning
Great Lakes pollution would be done.
In their request, the two governments also asked for Commission recommendations concerning water pollution prevention so as "to insure the
adequate protection and development of all interests involved on both
sides of the boundary and to fulfill the obligation undertaken in Article
IV. . . ." The IJC utilized the previously outlined procedure in conducting its investigation.48 The Commission employed scientists and engineers and obtained considerable cooperation from Canadian and U.S.
public health services." In 1918, six years after the request was made, the
Commission handed its report on boundary waters pollution to the governments of the United States and Canada. At that time the Great Lakes
were not considered polluted, but the Commission's findings cited the
connecting channels of the Detroit and Niagra Rivers as being very contaminated. 50 The rivers were characterized as being polluted "to an extent
51
which renders the water in its unpurified state unfit for drinking" and
as a threat to public health."2 The principal causes of this pollution and
53
serious health hazard were vessel, municipal, and industrial wastes.
" I.J.C. Files, Docket No. 4 (1912).
" Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 22, art. IV. See text, supra notes 28-31.
'7 I.J.C., Final Report on the Pollution of Boundary Waters 5 (1918) [hereinafter cited
as 1918 Report].
See text, supra notes 35-42, passim.
Jordan, Great Lakes Pollution: A Framework for Action, 5 OTTAWA L. J. 65, 68
(1971). This style of investigation set the pattern which the IJC would take in the future
regarding water pollution. The process was eventually institutionalized under the 1972 and
1978 Water Quality Agreements, supra notes 1 & 3.
50 1918 Report, supra note 47, at 51.
51 Id.
52 Id.
11 These sources of pollution are still regarded as the primary sources of pollution in
the Great Lakes today. See I.J.C., Report on Pollution of Lake Erie, Lake Ontario and the
International Section of the St. Lawrence River 4 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Report].
Therefore, while the enormity of the problem has changed in the last half-century, its primary causes remain the same. See Burns, U.S. Position on Negotiations Concerning the

Great Lakes, 1 SYRACUSE

INT'L

L. J. 199, 201 (1973).
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The Commission recommended that sewage treatment plants be constructed to alleviate the problem of discharged waste. Additionally, the
IJC made a recommendation that could have had important institutional
ramifications. The IJC attempted to acquire the enforcement and regulatory powers that had been denied it under the Boundary Waters Treaty
by recommending that it be given power to "regulate and prohibit" pollution of boundary waters." The initial response of Canada and the United
States was enthusiastic. The two governments requested the IJC to draft
a treaty that would lead to implementation of the recommendation."
In 1920, the Commission submitted a draft treaty to the United
States and Canada which would have authorized the IJC to investigate
and determine whether any party was responsibile for the pollution of the
boundary waters. This action could be undertaken by the Commission
without a formal request by the governments. 6 If any violations of the
Article IV pollution prohibition were discovered, the United States and
Canada would have been obligated to enforce legal remedies against the
violators. 5 But Canada and the United States never negotiated this
treaty, and the Commission was never clothed with jurisdictional authority over pollution of the Great Lakes boundary waters.58 Despite the increased influence that the IJC exercised in the field of water contamination, which culminated in the 1972 and 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreements, this jurisdictional authority has been continuously denied.
The shelving of the proposed treaty conferring regulatory powers
upon the Commission coincided with a period of disinterest upon the part
of the United States and Canada in Great Lakes pollution. Finally, in
1946 and 1948, the governments approached the Commission with two
references concerning boundary waters pollution. The IJC focused on the
connecting channels of Lakes Superior, Huron, Erie, and Ontario.5 ' The
IJC returned its report to Canada and the United States in 1950, stating
that the water quality of the connecting channels, such as the Detroit and
Niagara Rivers, was increasingly deteriorating due to the continuing discharge of domestic sewage and industrial waste.' 0 The Commission recommended that the two governments adopt minimum water quality
objectives for the connecting channels of the Great Lakes. The IJC also
recommended that it be authorized to maintain continuing supervision
over the water quality of these boundary waters."' Canada and the United
" 1970 Report, supra note 53, at 50.
" I.J.C. Files Docket No. 4-5-1:1 (1918).
GoId.
57 Id.
so Id.

SI.J.C. Files, Docket Nos. 54-55 (1946, 1948).
I.J.C., Report on the Pollution of Boundary Waters 8 (1950) [hereinafter cited as
1950 Report].
01 Id.
at 9-10. Jordan, supra note 49, at 70, characterized the recommendations as being
founded upon several assumptions by the IJC:
00
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States adopted these recommendations in 1951 and thereby modernized
the weaponry to combat water pollution in the Great Lakes system.
The IJC established two Advisory Boards to survey and monitor
water quality in the connecting channels. One board focuses on the Detroit, St. Mary's, and St. Clair Rivers in the western channel and the
other assesses the situation in the Niagara River in the East. When the
two boards detect pollution in contravention of the minimum objectives,
the Commission notifies the responsible polluter, and if there is inaction
on the polluter's part the Commission recommends action to the government that has enforcement jurisdiction."
The significance of the continuing surveillance over water quality by
the Advisory Boards is that this responsibility is not conferred upon the
IJC by the Boundary Waters Treaty. As one observer has noted, however,
Canada and the United States agreed that the IJC has the authority
under the Article IX reference procedure to monitor water quality." The
IJC has delegated this authority to its Advisory Boards, which periodically report its monitoring results to the Commission." In essence, this
process of continuing surveillance, periodic reports, and minimum objective standards continues through the present day, under the 1972 and
1978 Water Quality Agreements, as the procedure by which the United
States and Canada attempt to debate pollution in the Great Lakes.
The Objectives for Boundary Water Control, enunciated by the
Commission in its 1950 recommendations, delineated a series of minimum
standards designed to ensure the suitability of the water in the connecting channels." Setting water quality objectives, regardless of the progress
toward achieving them, has continued to be a major function of the IJC.
Though this mechanism was used extensively in the 1972 and 1978 Water
Quality Agreements, there was little effort to meet the 1951 water quality
standards. Thus, the role of the IJC may have been broadened and the
First, the Commission believed that the national governments would, in adopting
the objectives for water quality control, take measures necessary to insure that the
standards were made effective. Second, the Commission believed that if it maintained a continuing surveillance over the boundary waters, its constant presence
and the threat of adverse reports by it to the "appropriate authorities" would
secure reasonable compliance by municipalities and industries with the standards
set. Third, the Commission expected that with the pressure exerted by the national governments in adopting the objectives, the state and provincial governments would establish appropriate quality standards and enforce these standards
where persuasion failed.
62 I.J.C., Safeguarding Boundary Water Quality 28 (1961).
63 Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 22, art. IX. For an excellent summary of the
development of the Article IX reference procedure, see Burns, supra note 53, at 202,
wherein it is argued that a broad interpretation of Article IX is necessary to uphold a continuing concern of boundary waters quality. The 1972 and 1978 Water Quality Agreements
are consistent with such a position.
" Burns, supra note 53, at 202.
" 1950 Report, supra note 60, at 8.
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procedure may have been more established, but the Great Lakes system
was becoming more polluted. The IJC could only devise the battle plans;
it could not fight the war.
The mid-1960's was a period during which the public became acutely
aware of Great Lakes pollution. In 1964, Canada and the United States
made a joint reference to the IJC which resulted in the most significant
achievement in the field of Great Lakes pollution to date. The Commission was requested to thoroughly investigate the water quality 9 f the
lower Great Lakes (Erie and Ontario) and the international section of the
St. Lawrence River. 6" The Commission's procedure reflected the feelings
of the times. A five-year investigation, costing several million dollars, involved hundreds of experts and several agencies from both countries. After numerous public hearings, and the submission of three interim reports, the IJC submitted its final report on water pollution of the lower
Great Lakes in 1970." This report was the basis of the 1972 agreement
between the United States and Canada on Great Lakes Water Quality.

IV. THE 1972
A.

WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT

Origins of the Agreement

The 1970 Report of the Commission concluded that there was transboundary pollution in the Lower Great Lakes, that the contamination
constituted a health hazard to the people and property off both shores,
and that water quality deterioration would continue in the absence of
quick, responsive action.68 The IJC established a series of general and
specific objectives which it thought were necessary to stem the tide of
water pollution; it also set forth recommendations concerning methods
for obtaining these objectives.
The primary sources of this pollution were the same as those reported in 1918: municipalities, industry, and water vessels." But the effect of this contamination on the open lakes, especially Lake Erie, was
more evident and its ramifications were more ascertainable than in 1918
due to advanced technology and intensive investigation. The Great Lakes
were suffering from eutrophication resulting from the increased enrichment in the Great Lakes due to accelerated pollution. 0 Consequently, an
overabundance of plant nutrients promoted the growth of algae and consumed and depleted the water's oxygen supply. This process was hastening the deterioration of the Lakes, especially Lake Erie, which many had
cynically renamed "Dead Lake." 1
6 I.J.C. Files, Docket No. 83 (1964).

1970 Report, supra note 53.
Id.
6 Id. at 72.
7o Id. at 84.
7' Upper Lakes Reference Group, The Waters of Lake Huron and Lake Superior: Sum68
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A major thrust of the aforementioned water pollution recommendations was a weighted suggestion that Canada and the United States execute and implement a formal program and schedule to meet the stated
objectives. To bolster the proposed agreement, the Commission also recommended that the two countries confer on the Commission: "authority,
responsibility and means for coordination, surveillance, monitoring, implementation, making recommendations to government . . . and such
other duties related to the preservation and improvement of the quality
of the boundary waters of the Great Lakes - St. Lawrence System ... "
73
After two years of extensive negotiations, Canada and the United
7
States concluded the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1972,
75
which was structured heavily on the Commission's 1970 Report. The
Agreement, signed in Ottawa on April 15, 1972 by Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau and U.S. President Nixon, reaffirmed the obligation not to
pollute boundary waters under the Article IV prohibition of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. 7 ' The 1972 Agreement, which covered Lakes
Huron and Superior as well as the Lower Great Lakes, was an unprecedented manifestation of joint cooperation in the area of international environmental matters.
The tone of this cooperative venture to restore and enhance the
water quality of the Great Lakes is found in Article II of the 1972 Agreement. Canada and the United States adopted the general water quality
objectives advanced by the Commission's 1970 Report. The two nations
had internationally committed themselves to ensuring that the waters of
the Great Lakes system would be free from: substances that enter the
waters as a result of human activity and form putrescent deposits,
deleterious floating materials, harmful and toxic concentrations, or nutri77
ents that create nuisance growth of algae. These general water quality
objectives, commonly known as the "Five Freedoms", provide the philomary and Recommendations 127 (Report to the Int'l Joint Comm'n 1976). The U.L.R.G., an
advisory board to the IJC on water quality in the Upper Great Lakes, explains in more
detail:
[E]uthrophic lakes are rich in plant nutrients and support extensive growths of
plant material. Increased algae growth results in greater water turbidity. This,
among other things, presents clarification problems for water supply systems and
makes water less desirable for recreational purposes. . . .Health hazards are also
increased because microbial populations, including pathogenic species, are stimulated by enrichment.
Id. at 130.
72 1970 Report, supra note 53, at 156.
11 For a recitation and analysis of the negotiation process which resulted in the 1972
Quality Agreement, see Wardroper, Canada's Interests as Regard Protection and Regulation of the Great Lakes, 1 SYRACUSE INT'L L. J. 205, 208 (1973).
1972 Water Quality Agreement, supra note 3.
Id. Preamble.
76 Id.
7 Id. art. II.
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sophical foundation for the more concrete provisions of the 1972
ment. Abstract notions of cleanliness will result in restoration
Great Lakes but the Five Freedoms demonstrate the international
tance attached to the 1972 Agreement by Canada and the United
B.

Agreeof the
imporStates.

Urgency and Effectiveness

Expedience was important to the drafters of the 1972 Agreement to
fulfill the general and specific water quality objectives,7s and because of
the public clamor over the conditions of the Great Lakes. This sense of
urgency was reflected in Article V, which enumerated programs to fulfill
the 1972 Agreement:
Programs and other measures directed toward the achievement of the
water quality objectives shall be developed and implemented as soon as
practicable in accordance with legislation in the two countries. Unless
otherwise agreed, such programs and other measures shall be either complete or in the process of implementation by December 31, 1975.7'

The programs encompassed under Article V included those designed to
cope with pollution from municipal sources, industrial sources, agriculture, and thermal discharges.8o Programs and specific water quality standards were set out in detail in the Annexes to the Articles of the 1972
Agreement. Detailed technical regulation was applied in areas which were
primarily responsible for the accelerated eutrophication of the Great
Lakes phosphorous and nutrient loading. 81
Article VI of the 1972 Agreement followed the IJC's recommendations that the IJC be given greater powers and responsibilities. The Commission was authorized to expand its activities in monitoring programs,
coordinating research, and collecting and reporting data concerned with
the Great Lakes. 82 Article VII mandated that the Commission establish a
Great Lakes Water Quality Board and a Research Advisory Board to assist the IJC in fulfilling its functions. These boards also were to determine whether Canada and the United States were conforming with the
letter and spirit of the 1972 Agreement." The IJC was instructed to report annually to Canada, the United States, and the State and Provincial
Governments, on the effectiveness of programs toward fulfilling the water
quality objectives."
As noted earlier, the 1972 Agreement represents a watershed in the
" Id. art III. The specific water quality objectives are set forth in Article III and
described in detail in Annex 1, 14, of the agreement.
'9 Id. art. V. For a detailed account of how this wording was
reached, see Wardroper,
supra note 73, at 216.
80 1972 Water Quality Agreement, supra note 3, art. V.
8' Id. Annex 2.
82 Id. art. VI.
88 Id. art. VII(l).
84 Id. art. VI(3).
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international commitment of Canada and the United States to restore
and enhance the water quality of the Great Lakes. The establishment of a
joint institution such as the Great Lakes Water Quality Board, with equal
representation from both countries, including members from each riparian state and province, was an important step in transcending national
politics to alleviate a binational problem. A permanent, joint organization
created to restore water quality should be able to lay blame and credit on
the proper country. The members of the Board were implicity mandated
to serve the interests of the IJC and the Great Lakes. The intent of the
countries seemed clear: perform your functions with minimal unilateral
interference. The faith that Canada and the United States placed in
transnational organizations as the IJC and its watchdog board was clearly
an atypical international commitment.
The optimism over the 1972 Agreement was best expressed by one
observer, who noted that, "We are dealing with a dynamic situation in
the ecological as well as the human institutional sense and we have created a dynamic international instrument to deal with both aspects."'
The spirit of the two great signatories emphasized the dynamic importance of the instrument. Yet, was the 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality
Agreement as successful in prompting action and results as it was as an
international legal symbol? Before answering this question, there is a
handicap which must be re-emphasized. Although the 1972 Agreement
significantly broadened the IJC's scope, the Commissions's lack of enforcement powers effectively prevented the Commission from ensuring
that its recommendations were implemented. The federal, state and provincial governments were responsible for implementing the programs and
measures called for in the 1972 Agreement. Thus, though the causes and
effects of water pollution transcends jurisdictional boundaries, the active
role in preventing water pollution and fulfilling water quality objectives
lies with the governments and not with a joint, transnational
organization.
In the final analysis, only the signatories of the 1972 Agreement
would force compliance with its terms; and such force was left in the
hands of politicians, legislators and their constituents. Institutionally, the
1972 Water Quality Agreement represented a committed, complex effort
to improve the water quality of the Great Lakes, but its importance is
clouded by what it failed to accomplish.
In all fairness, the significance of the 1972 Agreement cannot be diminished by the slow restoration of lakes which had been deteriorating
for the last 200 years. Perhaps the IJC could have maintained the cleanup effort if it had been granted jurisdictional and regulatory powers. In
the period between the 1972 and 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements, however, the luster of the 1972 Agreement was tarnished by the
85Wardroper, supra note 73, at 221.
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lack of action in achieving its objectives. Both nations hesitated to implement programs mandated by the 1972 Agreement. As the International
Joint Commission reported in 1978, "One of the dominant themes in recent reports, that progress towards the goals of the Agreement has been
tgenerally slow, uneven and in certain cases, disappointing,'
continues to
be the case."1 This comment does not mean that the Agreement had
failed, nor that Canada and the United States were standing idly on their
shores watching the Great Lakes rapidly deteriorate.81 Rather, the snailpaced progress indicates that extensively contaminated water cannot be
expurgated merely by a detailed, complex agreement.
C.

Conflicting Standards: Municipal Wastes •

One problem area that illustrates the ambivalent nature of progress
on the part of Canada and the United States is municipal wastewater
treatment. In 1971, 80 percent of the Canadian population in the Great
Lakes Basin had adequate sewage facilities compared to 5 percent of the
United States population in the region. 86 Special emphasis was placed on
this problem in the 1972 Agreement since the IJC's 1970 report indicated
that municipal waste was a primary source of pollution in the Great
Lakes. Article V of the Agreement directed that programs for the abatement and control of municipal waste were to be completed or "in process
of implementation by December 31, 1975."89 Considerable progress was
made in developing the necessary programs and facilities to fulfill this
commitment and those of the water quality objectives. Thus, in 1978, the
IJC reported that municipal treatment facilities provided adequate treatment for 64 percent of the sewered population in the Great Lakes Basin.10
In naked numerical terms, this increase represents outstanding progress
in coping with a primary source of pollution in the Great Lakes. Nevertheless, this progress must be tempered by a discussion of problems associated with its accomplishment.
Each side of the Great Lakes set different standards for defining the
"adequate" treatment of municipal waste. The United States
required a
minimum of secondary treatment with standards for effluent concentrations for biochemical oxygen demand and suspended solids.' 1 Ontario defined adequate waste treatment on the basis of the steps necessary to pre1978 Report, supra note 12, at 3.
It would be a gross inaccuracy to say there was no progress at all during
the period
between the 1972 and 1978 Agreements. As the IJC noted in 1978, "Although
progress has
been slow, public surveys indicate that those who use the Great Lakes see
overall improvements." Id.
88 1978 Report, supra note 12, at 3.
11 1972 Water Quality Agreement, supra note 3, art. V.
0 I.J.C., Seventh Annual Report on Great Lakes Water Quality
49 (1979).
", Great Lakes Water Quality Board,
Fifth Annual Report to the International Joint
Commission 29 (1977) [hereinafter cited as G.L.W.Q.B. Fifth Annual
Report].
1,
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2
vent a pollution impact by waste discharge on the receiving waters.
In practice, no significant difference in the programs implemented by
Canada and the United States in municipal waste treatment are traceable
to differing definitions of "adequate." Both countries generally subject
93
their municipal sewerage flow to secondary treatment. The significance
of this small discrepancy is that it reflects the subtle differences that arise
when two countries only partially commit themselves to alleviate a joint
problem. Each jurisdiction has its own method of defining problems, remedies, and standards. Thus, the 1972 Agreement set forth objectives and
programs but the means of achieving those ends was not put in the hands
of a binational body. Under such circumstances, it was inevitable that
each party would adapt remedial measures which would best account for
particular political, economical, and technological factors. The progress
that has been made to adequate treatment of municipal wastewater is a
tribute to both countries, and signifies the importance that both nations
placed on restoring the water quality of the Great Lakes.
One aspect of the effort to alleviate the effects of municipal waste
discharge involved the interpretation of the 1972 Agreement's language
calling for the remedial programs to be "in process of implementation by
December 31, 1975."" Canada and the United States viewed this clause
differently when it became evident in 1975 that the United States was not
going to meet the objectives of the 1972 Agreement. Canada and Ontario
believed that construction of the facilities was to have begun by the date
mandated in the 1972 Agreement. The United States did not interpret
the phrase to require groundbreaking by this date but that the granting
of funds for the construction of municipal treatment facilities would be
satisfactory.9s In the United States, complex Environmental Protection
Agency regulations had to be met in the areas of design, planning, and
9
environmental impact before money would be appropriated. 1 The subsequent delay in funding reflected the inadequacies of the 1972 Agreement
and the Commission. Clearly, the IJC was powerless to compel the United
States to meet the agreed-upon objectives or bind either country to a single interpretation of the 1972 Agreement.

92 Id.

Id.

"

By 1976, 86% of the Ontario municipal sewage was receiving secondary treatment.

I 1972 Water Quality Agreement, supra note 3, art. V.
" Presumably, both parties to the 1972 Agreement understood the phrase at the time
of the signing to mean construction would commence by December 31, 1975. It was reported
in one Canadian newspaper that the United States' intrepretation emerged when compliance with the 1972 Agreement became impossible. The primary reason for the delay was
simply diagnosed as the United States being "enmeshed in so much bureaucratic red tape."
Globe & Mail, March 13, 1975, at 11, col. 6.
" Pursuant to 33 U.S.C. §1251, General Pretreatment Regulations for Existing and
New Sources of Pollution, 40 municipal programs were in the process of implementation.
See G.L.W.Q.B. Fifth Annual Report, supra note 91, at 30.
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Moreover, the above difficulties graphically illustrate how the efficacy
of a milestone in international joint cooperation can be minimized if the
parties do not internally commit themselves to reach the same
7
objectives .
The 1972 Agreement was an international legal blueprint for an unusual joint project. The Agreement was to last for five years and thereafter until terminated by either party."8 At the end of the five-year period,
however, a general feeling existed that even though the 1972 Agreement
was a credit to the international and legal efforts of Canada and the
United States, and even though progress was somewhat noticeable, major
structural revisions were needed to achieve the goal of restoring the Great
Lakes." Canada and the United States embodied those revisions in the
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978 and thereby reaffirmed
their joint commitment to a cleaner Great Lakes system.
V.

A.

THE 1978 GREAT LAKES WATER QUALITY AGREEMENT

The Ecosystem Approach

The 1978 Agreement between the two friendly neighbors is an international legal instrument based upon the 1972 Agreement and the annual
reports of the IJC.100 This Agreement came at an important juncture in
the effort to restore and enhance the Great Lakes. There was a general
consensus that continued cooperative efforts were necessary and would be
beneficial. Yet, it was also recognized that the existing institutional mechanisms were inadequate and perhaps not worth future funding. ' The
1978 Agreement reconciled these divergent interests by modifying the
1972 Agreement and the programs, objectives, and focus of the joint in9 The prime example of the Great Lakes restoration effort being frustrated
because of
internal delay is the case of Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 514 F.2d
492 (8th Cir.
1975), modified, 529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976). This dispute, which lasted a decade,
centered
on the discharge of taconite tailings into Lake Superior by the Reserve Mining
Company at
Silver Bay, Minnesota. The process started in 1969 with an investigation by
the U.S. Department of the Interior, followed by the Environmental Protection Agency
filing suit in
1972. The case became more complex when it was discovered that the tailing
contained
fibers similar to those found in asbestos, which have been determined to be potentially
carcinogenic. After being fined for violations of water-pollution laws and non-compliance,
Reserve began a massive environmental control project in 1977 which is currently
projected to
cost $370 million. The disposal system was designed to totally stop the discharge
of tailings,
which were to be deposited in a nearby basin. The system was completed in
1980, eleven
years after the controversy arose. See generally McWethy, When Government
and Industry
Tangle Over the Environment, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 10, 1977, at 63;
Wright, Mile
Post 7, GREAT LAKES Focus ON WATER QUALITY, Sept. 1979, at 17.
98 1972 Water Quality Agreement, supra note 3, art. XIII.
See Current Evaluation of Water Quality May Be Insufficient, I.J.C. Focus,
Sept.
1977, at 1.
300 1978 Water Quality Agreement, supra note
1, Preamble.
103 See Great Lakes Clean-Up-Progressthrough 1976, I.J.C. Focus,
Sept. 1977, at 3.
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ternational institutions.

The most important change regarding Great Lakes pollution is the
recognition by Canada and the United States that the Great Lakes Basin"" is an ecosystem in which the causes and the effects of pollution are
08
not restricted to the actual boundary waters.' This ecosystem approach
represents a switch from the "system external-to-man" concept inherent
in the 1972 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement to an approach
0
founded on a "man-in-a-system concept."1 The 1978 Agreement integrates the ecosystem approach upon the recommendation of the IJC and
05
its Great Lakes Research Advisory Board.' This significant shift in focus
means that the water quality of the Great Lakes is not directed exclusively at the Great Lakes system. The ecosystem/basin-wide approach
stresses that the water quality approach of the 1972 Agreement was cura16
tive, rather than preventative. ' In the most elementary sense, the water
quality approach, by focusing on the conditions of the lakes and not the
condition within the total framework of an interacting ecosystem, was a
desperate attempt to compensate for all the previous abuses. At the time
of the 1972 Agreement, this was an exemplary approach, because a less
expansive focus was probably more acceptable to and manageable by Canada and the United States in this initial cooperative effort. The 1978
Agreement and its emphasis on the ecosystem recognizes that the transboundary contamination of the Great Lakes Basin results from human
activities on the land drained by the Great Lakes. Thus, the coordinated
efforts of the two nations must focus on these activities, especially as the
The 1978 Agreement states that the term "'Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem' means
the interacting components of air, land, water and living organisms, including man, within
the drainage basin of the St. Lawrence River at or upstream from the point at which this
river becomes the international boundary between Canada and the United States." 1978
Water Quality Agreement, supra note 1, art. I.
103 In the Preamble to the 1978 Agreement, Canada and the United States specifically
recognize that "restoration and enhancement of the boundary waters cannot be achieved
independently of other parts of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem with which these waters
interact." Id. at Preamble.
'0 Great Lakes Research Advisory Board, The Ecosystem Approach: Scope and Implications of an Ecosystem Approach to Transboundary Problems in the Great Lakes Basin, at
vii (Special Report to the Int'l Joint Comm'n (1978)) [hereinafter cited as The Ecosystem
Approach].
of the
105 See generally id.; 1978 Report, supra note 12. The first two recommendations
were:
Board
Great Lakes Research Advisory
(1) that the Parties (Canada and the United States) and the Commission explicitly recognize as policy the need for an ecosystem approach to problem identification, research, and management in the Great Lakes Basin;
(2) that the Parties extend or amend the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 and the
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1972 in accordance with the philosophy
of the ecosystem approach ....
The Ecosystem Approach, supra note 104, at viii.
'06 The Ecosystem Approach, supra note 104, at 6.
102
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burden on the waters increases directly with the growth in population. 107
One source of impetus for this expansive philosphical outlook was the
work of the International Reference Group on Great Lakes Pollution
from land use activities (PLUARG).108 PLUARG concerned itself with
nonpoint' ° ' sources of pollution and their effects on the Great Lakes. The
inquiry extended beyond the water quality of the boundary waters to in-

clude the effects on sediment and biota within the entire Basin area."11

PLUARG's reports to the IJC on land drainage sources of pollution resulted in a greater understanding of the link between Basin land use and
water pollution in the Great Lakes system.""' The ecosystem approach of
the 1978 Water Quality Agreement, as advocated by PLUARG, stresses
that increased human activity in a drainage area more than twice the size
of the boundary waters requires more emphasis on the interacting relationships within this complex environment." 2
The 1978 Agreement also incorporates PLUARG's ideas in Article VI
Programs and Remedial Measures. This Article provides extensive measures to abate and control pollution from agriculture, forestry, and other
land use activities."' In order to fulfill the specific and general water
quality objectives of the 1978 Agreement,"" the Agreement mandates the
implementation of programs such as those to control pest control prod-

ucts, the disposal of liquid and solid wastes and the practice of road salting. These provisions reflect, on two levels, a greater commitment to restore the Great Lakes. On the general focus level, the land use provisions

"07 Id. The Great Lakes Research Advisory Board analogized the effectiveness of the
water quality approach to "blood analysis" as a method of maintaining human health:
To be sure, blood analysis is a necessary tool, and often crucial in medical diagnosis, but it does not by itself provide accurate information on the variety of illnesses or injuries which may occur, nor does it adequately reflect the entry of
poisons through organs such as the lungs or gut, until too late.
Id. at 3.
101 PLUARG was formed pursuant to the 1972 Water Quality Agreement, supra note 3,
in which, under Article VII, the International Joint Commission was granted the authority
to establish bodies to undertake specific tasks. One of those specific tasks was the responsibility of PLUARG, which fulfilled a request made to the IJC by Canada and the United
States to report upon "[plollution of the Boundary waters of the Great Lakes System from
agricultural, forestry, and other land use activities.
1972 Water Quality Agreement,
supra note 3, art. VI(1)(f)(i).
0 Nonpoint pollutants are sources of pollution which can best be defined
by contrasting them with point sources. The latter are described by PLUARG as "pipeline" pollutants
such as municipal or industrial wastewater. Nonpoint pollutants, often referred to as diffuse
pollutants, reach the Great Lakes system via the natural runoff from sewers, ditches, and
groundwater. See PLUARG, supra note 6, at 9.
0 Id. at 17.
' One glaring example is the use of road salt in the Basin. Every year approximately
2.8 million metric tons, about 175 pounds (80 kilograms) per person are spread on roads.
The Ecosystem Approach, supra note 104, at 9.
12

PLUARG, supra note 6, at 17.

1978 Water Quality Agreement, supra note 1, art. VI.
Id. art. VI(1)(e).
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bolster the ecosystem approach. Yet, on a level characterized by remedial
programs, the measures are more detailed and specific than in the 1972
Agreement.
Another pollution source that is addressed in the 1978 1Agreement
6
last
the
In
pollutants.
but not in the 1972 Agreement - is airborne
decade, Canada and the United States have expressed concern over a
phenomena known as "acid rain.""" Acid rain results from the burning of
fossil fuels and power plant emissions which produce nitrogen and sulfur
oxides. These oxides react with moisture in the atmosphere to damage
1 7
The 1978 Agreement, through the
vegetation, waterways and buildings.
dealing with airborne polprovisions
ecosystem approach and the specific
United States' commitand
Canada
lutants such as acid rain, exemplifies
that affects the
pollution
ment to address any source of transboundary
with Article IV
consistent
is
accord
Great Lakes Basin. This international
prohibited
absolutely
which
1909
of
of the Boundary Waters Treaty
on an
property
or
health
to
injury
transboundary pollution which caused
opposite shore." 8
B.

The Conflict of Internal Powers

Although the 1978 Agreement incorporates new specific quality
objectives," 9 new interim phosphorus loading goals,' new deadlines for
2
municipal pollution control programs' ' and increased emphasis on toxic
substances, 22 the potential success of Canada and the United States in
fulfilling the terms of the agreement will depend on their internal policies
and the powers conferred upon transnational bodies such as the IJC. Article VII of the 1978 Agreement confers essentially the same powers, responsibilities, and functions upon the Commission as did the 1972 Agreement. "' 8 Thus, the 1978 Agreement withholds the granting of specific and
enforcement jurisdiction, but gives the Commission the responsibilities to
collect, analyze and disseminate data, to conduct investigations and to
11

Id. art. VI(1)(1).

,l Gywnne, Death in the Sky, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 22, 1979, at 107. See generally CanadaUnited States Law Institute Conference Proceedings: The TransnationalImplications of
Acid Rain, 5 CAN.-U.S. L. J. (1981) (conference held at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law, March 28, 1981).
17 The Ecosystem Approach, supra note 104, at 7.
See Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 22, art. IV.
119 1978 Water Quality Agreement, supra note 1, art. IV.
12 Id. Annex 3.

which
121 This deadline is more specific than that of the 1972 Agreement, supra note 3,
had resulted in a misunderstanding of its terms. Under the latest pact, Canada and the
United States have made the commitment that "[tihese programs shall be completed as
soon as practicable, and in the case of municipal sewage treatment facilities no later than
December 31, 1982." 1978 Water Quality Agreement, supra note 1, art. VI.
12 1978 Water Quality Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 1.
"2
Id. art. VII.
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make recommendations. Toperform its duties under the 1978 Agreement,
the Commission may make use of the services of the Water Quality Board
and the Science Advisory Board.1 '
The Commission's lack of enforcement powers does not square well
with the new binational emphasis on pollution as a basin-wide, ecosystem
issue. The Great Lakes Research Advisory Board, in its special report to
the IJC prior to the signing of the 1978 Agreement, insisted that the
Great Lakes restoration effort lacked an integrative framework. According
to the Board, "This necessary integrative framework is an ecosystem approach. ' 1 2 5 Although Canada and the United States adopted this approach based on the interaction of forces in the 1978 Agreement, they
failed to provide a similar restructuring of the transnational institutions
affected by this new focus. The 1978 Agreement is, therefore, glaringly
inconsistent because Canada and the United States have recognized the
transboundary nature of the hazard which is the subject of the Water
Quality Agreement, and yet the two countries will have to continue to
rely on internal enforcement to fulfill their commitment.
In 1968, Frederick J. E. Jordan discussed the limits of joint and bilateral institutions, such as the IJC, in their attempts to counteract the
transnational causes and effects of environmental contaminants. 12 6 Jordan's characterization of the inadequate powers bestowed by Canada and
the United States upon the Commission is as appropriate in an analysis
of the 1978 Agreement as it was a decade before. Mr. Jordan notes that
the Commission acts upon a reference from Canada and the United
States because the Commission is without specific jurisdiction over issues
of transboundary contamination.1 27 Furthermore, the Commission cannot
enforce the relevant provisios against those responsible for the pollution
or compel the respective government to carry out the enforcement proceedings.1 26 Thus, the Water Quality Agreements of 1972 and 1978 do not
remedy these limitations and the restoration and enhancement of the
Great Lakes Basin depends on unilateral internal reactions instead of
joint and bilateral proscriptions. As a result, IJC operates with limited
powers in an outstanding manner. Unfortunately, it is not entirely structured to meet the challenge of the transboundary problems which con" Article VIII of the 1978 Water Quality Agreement, id., is the provision under which
Canada and the United States mandated the composition of a Great Lakes Water Quality
Board and a Great Lakes Science Advisory Board. The Water Quality Board's members are
equally represented by both countries, including representatives from each of the State and
Provincial governments. The Science Advisory Board (formerly the Research Advisory
Board under the 1972 Agreement) is composed of experts in the field of Great Lakes water
quality and related disciplines. Id. art. VII(1)(a)-(b).
128 The Ecosystem Approach, supra note 104, at vii.
126 Jordan, Recent Developments in InternationalEnvironmental Control, 15 McGILL

L. REv. 279 (1969).
127Id. at 300.
128

Id.

CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:208

front Canada and the United States.
A transnational organization with limited powers is not the proper
yehicle to converge the ecosystbm approach with ,the -institutional enforcement machinery. No'level of government of either nation should be
required to surrender its authority over matteis within its jurisdiction.
Still, the traditional approach of binational cooperiktion and negotiation
needs to be supplemented by an institutional afrangement that can coordinate the forces which each jurisdiction is using to fulfill its commitments under the 1978 Agreement.
In 1972, a group of U.S. and Canadian univeristy faculty members
called for the creation of a joint body responsible for policy and management functions delegated to it by Canada and the United States. " Essentially, the proposed organization would have surveillance and dissemination functions similar to thoie of the IJC.3 0 Additionally, this
organization would be cloaked with "mediation" powers which would enable it to develop joint programs, cooidinate various agencies, and operate independently of the Artiele IX reference procedure.1 31 Finally, this
expansion of responsibilities would create the opportunity for Canada
and the United States to endow the organization with131specific enforcement powers over transnational management problems.
The 1978 Water Quality Agreement does not incorporate the above
recommendations.3 But this does not minimize the significance of the
Agreement or the role of the IJC. The 1978 Water Quality Agreement is
the latest milestone in a tradition of bilateral cooperation between two
neighboring nations. The problem of remedying the effects of 200 years of
water quality contamination will not be immediately solved by the signing of two water quality agreements. Canada and the United States, in
undertaking this task, bestowed considerable responsibilities on the IJC
1" A Proposal for Improving the Management of the Great Lakes of the United States
and Canada 46 (1973), reprinted in 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 103, 134 (Canada-United States
University Seminar, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Great Lakes Management Proposal].

130Id.

Id. at 134-35.
Great Lakes Management Proposal stressed the need for flexibility in vesting
responsibilities upon a transnational agency involved with the Great Lakes Basin. A flexible
organization could anticipate transboundary problems and fulfill a preventitive function instead of a reactive one. The result would be a broader base-of program coordination structured to match the fluctuations in Great Lakes water quality issues. Id. at 135.
13 Various commentators have recommended that Canada and the United States make
use of the power of decision conferred upon the International Joint Commission under Article X of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. This provision enables the United States and
Canada to refer a dispute to the Commission which can then inquire into the facts and
circumstances of the dispute and render a conclusion. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note
22, art. X. This procedure has never been exercised because the two countries have never
surrendered their jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it has been argued that the invocation of the
power would give more direction to the restoration effort. The Ecosystem Approach, supra
note 104, at ix.
131

132 The
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in their effortto reverse the problems caused by an expanding population
and the increased use of Great Lakes Basin resources.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It may be premature .for Canada and the United States to vest regulatory powers upon the IJC, but as the cooperative effort continues, a
joint organization such as the Commission may be granted these -responsibilities. The functions of the Commission are evolving from a position of
pure surveillance to one of tendering advice.134 It is conceivable that Canada and the United States will eventually forge a bilateral management
institution that corresponds to the, proscriptive ecosystem approach]. Although the 1978 Water Quality Agreement is deficient in some areas, it
succeeds through its new broader approach, specific objectives, and detailed standards. Among the ongoing efforts between Canada and the
United States to restore the quality of life in the Great Lakes Basin, the
1978 Water Quality Agreement-stands as a dual symbol of renewed and
new commitment.

134

See 79 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 23, 24 (Jan. 1979).

